

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PEKING 00369 01 OF 03 050719Z

12

ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 EUR-25 SAJ-01 SAM-01 NIC-01 IO-14 ACDA-19

DRC-01 /151 W

----- 116716

R 050600Z MAR 74

FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1453

INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 PEKING 0369

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT CH

SUBJ: CHOU EN-LAI - CHINA'S LEADING MAOIST?

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. IN THE PROCESS OF ATTEMPTING TO MAKE SENSE OUT OF THE VARIOUS CURRENTS AND COUNTER-CURRENTS OF CHINA'S LATES IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN, OUR POLITICAL SECTION PRODUCED FOR INTERNAL CONSIDERATION THE FOLLOWING HIGHLY SPECULATIVE NEW LOOK AT RECENT EVENTS AND POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS. WE ARE TRANSMITTING IT TO WASHINGTON AND HONG KONG WITH THE THOUGHT THAT THE PROCESS OF EXAMINING -- AND PERHAPS POKING HOLES IN THE VARIOUS HYPOTHESES ADVANCED IN IT -- MIGHT BE USEFUL IN REFINING OR REVISING OUR GENERALLY ACCEPTED VIEWS OF POLITICAL FORCES IN CHINA. BASICALLY, WE POSTULATE CHOU EN-LAI AS THE LEADER OF THE LEFT UNDER MAO AND TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT "THE SHANGHAI RADICALS" WE WOULD WELCOME COMMENTS. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

1. ONE OF THE GIVENS IN NEARLY EVERY ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE IS THE IDEA THAT CHOU EN-LAI IS A "MODERATE" HEADING THE "MODERATE FACTION" WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND DEFENDING HIS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PEKING 00369 01 OF 03 050719Z

"MODERATE" POLICIES AGAINST ATTACKS FROM THE LEFT.

NEARLY EVERYONE AGREES THAT THIS MODEL IS LESS THAN SATISFACTORY IN ITS SIMPLICITY, BUT AS A SORT OF SHORT-HAND FOR THE PRESUMED DIVISIONS WITHIN CHINESE SOCIETY IT HAS REMAINED THE MOST CONVENIENT DEVICE AVAILABLE. RECENT INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA MAKE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO FIT A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS INTO THIS MODERATE VS. LEFT MOLD, HOWEVER, AND WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO CONSTRUCT A NEW MODEL WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL SUGGEST A USEFUL ALTERNATE MEANS OF ANALYZING THE CONFUSING AND APPARENTLY CONTRADICTORY EVENTS SINCE THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS.

2. AGAIN FOR CONVENIENCE SAKE, THIS MODEL WOULD BE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS. HOWEVER, THEY WOULD CONFORM MUCH MORE CLOSELY TO THE MANNER IN WHICH THE CHINESE THEMSELVES DEFINE "THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN TWO LINES". ON THE ONE HAND ARE THE TRADITIONALIST-BOLSHEVIK ELEMENTS CONSISTING OF THE REMNANTS OF THE CONSERVATIVE WING OF THE PARTY FORMERLY HEADED BY LIU SHAO-CHI, TEN HSIAO-PING, PENG CHEN, ET AL, THE BULK OF THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND MANY LOWER LEVEL PARTY AND GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRATS. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE SCALE WE WOULD PUT THE "MAOISTS" HEADED BY MAO AND CHOU PLUS NEARLY ALL OF THE TOP PARTY LEADERSHIP INCLUDING THE SO-CALLED SHANGHAI RADICALS. THIS GROUP WOULD FIND A BROAD BASE OF SUPPORT PARTICULARLY AMONG YOUNGER PARTY CADRE AND YOUTH.

3. NEITHER GROUP, OBVIOUSLY, IS COMPLETELY HOMOGENEOUS AND EACH WOULD FUNCTION MORE LIKE A COALITION, HAVING VARYING SPECIFIC AIMS BUT A BROAD CONSENSUS ON LONG TERM OBJECTIVES. OLD LINE PARTY MEN AND MILITARY LEADERS OBVIOUSLY WILL NOT AGREE ON ALL POINTS, BUT THEY PROBABLY FIND COMMON GROUND IN DEFENSE OF THEIR POWER BASES, THEIR PERQUISITES AND IN OPPOSITION TO DISRUPTION AND CHANGE. THESE ARE THE PEOPLE WHO OPPOSE MAY 7 CADRE SCHOOLS, USE INFLUENCE TO GET THEIR CHILDREN INTO COLLEGES AND TO AVOID THEIR GOING DOWN TO THE COUNTRYSIDE. THESE PEOPLE ROSE THROUGH THE RANKS WHEN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND ARMY MORE CLOSELY RESSEMBLED THEIR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS THAN THEY DO IN POST-CULTURAL REVOLUTION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PEKING 00369 01 OF 03 050719Z

CHINA. THEY MAY ALSO SHARE A COMMON SKEPTICISM ABOUT DETENTE WITH THE UNITED STATES (HIGH LEVEL AMERICAN CONTACTS WITH ACTIVE CHINESE MILITARY LEADERS HAVE BEEN MINIMAL) AND SOME, AGAIN IN THE MILITARY, MAY SEE ADVANTAGES IN AT LEAST A LIMITED DIMINUTION IN SINO-SOVIET TENSIONS. IF ONE COULD CAPSULIZE SUCH DIVERSE ISSUES, THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE A RETURN TO PRE-1958 POLICIES IN CHINA.

4. ON THE MAOIST SIDE, A DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE BETWEEN MODERATION AND PRAGMATISM. IN THE FIELD OF IDEOLOGY, I. E., THE PROCESS OF SHAPING A MAOIST CHINA, THEY, INCLUDING CHOU, CAN AGREE THAT MODERATION FREQUENTLY IS THE MASK FOR A RETURN TO THE OLD WAYS. PRAGMATISM, HOWEVER, IN SUCH AREAS AS SINO-U.S. DETENTE, ECONOMIC POLICY AND INNOVATIVE PLANS SUCH AS EDUCATIONAL REFORM AND PARAMEDICAL PROGRAMS FOR THE COUNTRYSIDE CAN FIND GENERAL AGREEMENT IN VARYING DEGREES, EITHER AS DESIRABLE LONG TERM GOALS OR AS NECESSARY TEMPORARY EXPEDIENTS FOR THE GOOD OF CHINA.

JENKINS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PEKING 00369 02 OF 03 050719Z

12

ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 EUR-25 NIC-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 IO-14 ACDA-19

DRC-01 /151 W

----- 116722

R 050600Z MAR 74

FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1454

INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 PEKING 0369

5. PLACING CHOU IN THE MAOSIT CAMP HAS OBVIOUS AND SIGNIFICANT IMPLICATIONS. EXCEPT FOR PERSONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE MAOIST GROUP ITSELF, HE WOULD NO LONGER BE A TARGET OF ATTACK FROM THE LEFT SINCE HE IS A PART OF THE LEFT. VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT, THE EVENTS FROM LATE DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR TO THE PRESENT LOSE SOME OF THEIR ZIGZAG QUALITY AND CAN BE PLACED IN A MORE COMPREHENSIBLE PATTERN. HAVING INITIALLY LAUNCHED THE ANTI-LIN RECTIFICATION CAMPAIGN IN AUGUST, INTRODUCED THE ANTI-CONFUCIAN ELEMENT AND THEN UNITED THE TWO CAMPAIGNS,

THE FEBRUARY 2 "PEOPLE'S DAILY" EDITORIAL WAS THE DEVICE FOR MOVING INTO THE MASS PARTICIPATION STAGE, INCLUDING BIG CHARACTER POSTERS, WIDESPREAD STUDY SESSIONS AND RALLIES. THAT THERE WAS CONCERN LEST THE MASS PARTICIPATION ASPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN GET OUT OF HAND, HOWEVER, IS EVIDENCED BY REPORTS GOING BACK TO LATE JANUARY CITING CENTRAL COMMITTEE DIRECTIVES AGAINST SPONTANEOUS ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO VIOLENCE. IN ADDITION, THE "RED FLAG" EDITORIAL WHICH APPEARED IN "PEOPLE'S DAILY" FEBRUARY 6 AND WHICH EMPHASIZED PARTY CONTROL MOST LIKELY WAS ALREADY IN PREPARATION WHEN THE FEBRUARY 2 EDITORIAL WAS PUBLISHED. NEVERTHELESS, SOME OLD CULTURAL REVOLUTION WOUNDS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PEKING 00369 02 OF 03 050719Z

REOPENED AND SOME VIOLENCE DID OCCUR, NECESSITATING THE FEBRUARY 20 "PEOPLE'S DAILY" EDITORIAL FURTHER EMPHASIZING PARTY CONTROL.

6. IF CHOU AND THE MAOISTS WERE BASICALLY IN CONTROL AND GUIDING THE CAMPAIGN, HOW THEN TO EXPLAIN SUCH THINGS AS ARTICLES CRITICIZING DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY, APPARENTLY AN ATTACK ON THE CHOUIST POLICY OF ECONOMIC OPENING TO THE WEST? IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT MAO'S DICTUM OF "MAKING FOREIGN THINGS SERVE CHINA" IS ALSO A CONSTANT THEME IN THESE ARTICLES. IT SEEMS PLAUSIBLE TO READ THESE ARTICLES AS A REFLECTION OF THE INHERENT TENSIONS BETWEEN MAOIST PRAGMATISM AND THE MAOIST DEMAND THAT CHINA AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE NOT BE OVERCOME BY THEIR EXPOSURE TO THE WEST. IN THIS SENSE, THE NEW SHANGHAI PERIODICAL "STUDY AND CRITICISM" COULD BE SEEN AS A LEADING EDGE IN CHOU EN-LAI'S IDEOLOGICAL STRATEGY RATHER THAN A VOICE FROM THE LEFT CHALLENGING HIM.

7. THE SOVIET SPY INCIDENT, WHICH APPEARS TO BE AN ELEMENT IN THE CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN, ALSO SEEMS EXPLAINABLE IN TERMS OF THIS MODEL. PENG TE-HUAI, LO JUI-CHIN AND LIN PIAO WERE ALL TARRED WITH THE BRUSH OF HAVING SECRET CONNECTIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE PRESS AND AT LEAST ONE SENIOR OFFICIAL HAVE HINTED THERE MAY BE OTHERS. THE ARREST OF THE FIVE SOVIET DIPLOMATS, THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN STRESSING SOVIET WORLDWIDE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES, AND THE INTENSIFICATION OF ANTI-SOVIET POLEMICS MAY ALL BE AIMED, AT LEAST IN PART, AT THESE "TRADITIONALIST-BOLSHEVIK" ELEMENTS IN THE PARTY AND MILITARY. THESE MESSAGE IS A WARNING THAT THEY TOO COULD BE FOUND TO BE "RUSSIAN SPIES."

8. TWO EVENTS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE DURING THIS PERIOD ARE THE MASS SHUFFLE OF CHINA'S REGIONAL MILITARY

COMMANDERS AND RESTORATION OF FORMER PARTY SECRETARY
GENERAL TEN HSIAO-PING TO THE POLITBURO AMID INDICATIONS
THAT HE WILL MOVE INTO A MAJOR MILITARY ROLE. BOTH
MOVES WERE THE RESULT OF LENGTHY PREPARATIONS, PROBABLY
EXTENDING BACK OVER A YEAR. THE SIMULTANEITY OF THEIR
ANNOUNCEMENT SUGGESTS THEY WERE LINKED. TENG'S EARLY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 PEKING 00369 02 OF 03 050719Z

BACKGROUND, HIS ALLEGED ABILITY AS A MILITARY PLANNER,
HIS SERVICE IN SZECHUAN AS POLITICAL COMMISSAR UNDER
LIU PO-CHENG AND APPARENT LINKS TO SOME OF THE MAJOR
REGIONAL COMMANDERS SUGGEST THAT HE WAS PART OF A
COMPROMISE WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN STRUCK. THE MAOISTS
WOULD ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVE OF DISLODGING THE
REGIONAL COMMANDERS (ALBEIT IN A LIMITED FASHION
INVOLVING A SERIES OF BILATERAL SWAPS RATHER THAN A
WHOLESALE SHAKEUP) IN RETURN FOR PLACING TENG IN A
POSITION OF MAJOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPORTANCE
AT THE CENTER WHERE HE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO
INFLUENCE DECISIONS AFFECTING THE INTERESTS OF THESE
REGIONAL SATRAPS.

JENKINGS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PEKING 00369 03 OF 03 050720Z

12
ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 EUR-25 SAJ-01 SAM-01 IO-14 ACDA-19 NIC-01

DRC-01 /151 W

----- 116726

R 050600Z MAR 74
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1455
INFO AMCONSUL HONG KONG

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 3 OF 3 PEKING 0369

9. THE ROLES OF CHIANG CH'ING AND HER PROTEGE YAO WEN-YUAN ARE ANOMALIES DIFFICULT TO FIT INTO THE PROPOSED MODEL. HOWEVER, FROM THE ATTENTION CURRENTLY BEING DIRECTED TOWARD CULTURE AND ARTS IN THE CAMPAIGN TO CRITICIZE LIN PIAO AND CONFUCIUS, E.G., THE ATTACKS ON WESTERN MUSIC AND ANTONIONI, IT CAN BE ASSUMED THAT THESE TWO "CULTURAL" FIGURES ARE DEFINITELY INVOLVED IN SOME WAY. PERHAPS WHAT IS INVOLVED HERE IS A STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE ON PARTY POLICY WITHIN THE MAOIST GROUP BETWEEN ELEMENTS LED BY CHIANG CH'ING, WHOSE POWER POSITION SEEMS TO HAVE SLIPPED SINCE THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS, AND THE MAIN FORCE LED BY CHOU EN-LAI. IF SO, CHOU MAY BE FINDING IT NECESSARY TO TAKE AN EVEN MORE "LEFTIST" STANCE IN ORDER TO PREEMPT POSITIONS FROM WHICH HE AND HIS POLICIES COULD BE ATTACKED BY CHIANG CH'ING. IN THESE TERMS, THE CAMPAIGN IN THE CULTURAL REALM COULD SERVE THE DUAL PURPOSE OF DEALING WITH A CHALLENGE TO CHOU FROM THE EXTREME LEFT AND REINFORCING THE IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TRADITIONALIST-BOLSHEVIK ELEMENTS. THE RECENTLY CRITICIZED PLAY "THRICE ASCENDING MOUNT PEACH" CAN BE READ IN THAT LIGHT.

10. IN CONCLUSION, THERE CLEARLY IS A "STRUGGLE BETWEEN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PEKING 00369 03 OF 03 050720Z

TWO LINES"; THE QUESTION IS WHERE TO DRAW THE LINES. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MODERATION AND PRAGMATISM IS IMPORTANT. IN THIS CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MAOIST POSITION, MODERATION IN THE IDEOLOGICAL FIELD IS NO VIRTUE, WHILE PRAGMATISM IN CHINA'S NATIONAL INTEREST IS NO VICE. THIS VIEW, IT IS ARGUED, CAN BE SHARED BY MAO, CHOU, AND THE "SHANGHAI RADICALS." WHILE SUBJECTIVE APPRAISALS ARE TENUOUS AT BEST, THE YOUNG SHANGHAI LEADERS USLO OFFICERS HAVE MET HAVE BEEN IMPRESSIVE. THEY ARE CONFIRMED MAOISTS, BUT THEY ARE ALSO ARTICULATE, INTELLIGENT AND CONCERNED WITH SUCH MATTERS AS URBAN PLANNING AND BIRTH CONTROL. THE OPPOSITION, THE TRADITIONALIST-BOLSHEVIKS, FIT WELL THE PATTERN CREATED BY THE DESCRIPTION OF THE VICES OF LIN PIAO AND CONFUCIUS. ONE HAS ONLY TO GO SHOPPING IN ANY CITY IN CHINA OR OBSERVE WELL FED PLA OFFICERS AND THEIR AIDES ON TRAINS TO SEE THESE PEOPLE AND THEIR FAMILIES. THEY WILL BE A DIFFICULT GROUP TO CHANGE, AND AN ATTEMPT TO DISLODGE THEM COULD RISK SERIOUS DISRUPTION.

JENKINS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL STABILITY, POLITICAL LEADERS, POLITICAL SITUATION, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 MAR 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974PEKING00369
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: PEKING
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740367/aaaackir.tel
Line Count: 330
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 JUL 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <15 JUL 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <28 JAN 2003 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CHOU EN-LAI - CHINA'S LEADING MAOIST? INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. IN THE PROCESS OF ATTEMPTING
TAGS: PINT, CH, (CHOU EN-LAI)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005